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NOTES




The guarantees embodied in the first amendment's religion clause' re-
flect the Framers' concern that government should not interfere with reli-
giou belief or practice.2 By ensuring government neutrality, the
1. The religion clause of the first amendment provides that: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;" U.S.
CONST. amend. I. For a general discussion of the religion clause, see Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Poulos v. New Hamp-
shire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Other guarantees in the first amendment include the freedom of speech and press, associa-
tion, petition for redress of grievances, and assembly. This Note will be limited to a discus-
sion of the religion clause and reference to the first amendment is solely to that clause. For
further discussion of the other first amendment guarantees see Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350 (1977) (speech and press); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976) (speech and press); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (speech and press); Bond
v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (speech and press); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
(speech and press); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (speech and press);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (speech and press); Marchioro v. Cha-
ney, 422 U.S. 191 (1979) (association); Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. I (1971) (associa-
tion); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (association); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S.
288 (1964) (association); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (association); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (association); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
389 U.S. 217 (1967) (petition); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (petition);
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (assembly); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937)
(assembly); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (assembly). For a general discussion of
the first amendment guarantees, see H. DRINKER, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOUR
FREEDOMS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1957); I. STARR, THE IDEA OF LIBERTY: FIRST
AMENDMENT FREEDOMS (1978).
2. For a detailed historical outline of the events leading up to the ratification of the
first amendment, see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 427-28 (1962) (citing S. COBB, THE RISE
OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902); J. FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (1899); C. JAMES, THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN VIRGINIA (1900);
W. SWEET, RELIGION IN COLONIAL AMERICA (1942); W. SWEET, THE STORY OF RELIGION
IN AMERICA (1939)). For a further discussion of the events preceding enactment of the
religion clause, see C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL
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amendment protects against the power of the federal government control-
ling, supporting, or influencing an individual's religious beliefs.3 Through
the application of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court secured the first amendment's protections against the
states. This further guaranteed that neither the federal nor state govern-
ments would have the power to abridge religious freedom.4 Judicial treat-
ment of the first amendment's prohibitions has frequently distinguished
the two clauses within the amendment: the establishment clause5 and the
free exercise clause.6 Although both clauses protect the free exercise of
religion by individuals and religious institutions, each achieves that end in
a different manner. The focus of the establishment clause is protection
against government sponsorship or aid of any one religion, or excessive
ESTABLISHMENT: FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELI-
GIOUS CLAUSES (1964); E. GOTTHELF, FREEDOM OF RELIGION (1941); L. PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE & FREEDOM (1953); E. SMITH, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
(1972); A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH & STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (Rev. ed. 1964);
B. TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW & THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT, 1150-1650
(1982); Dahmus, Henry IV of England- An Example of Royal Control of the Church in the
Fifteenth Century, 23 J. CHURCH & ST. 35 (1981); Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current
Realities of the First Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 737 (1977); Pfeffer, The Deity in Ameri-
can Constitutional History, 23 J. CHURCH & ST. 215 (1981).
3. Engel, 370 U.S. at 429; see Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Me-
morial Presbyterian Church (Hull Church), 393 U.S. 440 (1969); School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947).
4. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962); Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); see also Berger, The
Fourteenth Amendment.- The Framers' Design, 30 S.C.L. REV. 495 (1979); Note, Constitu-
tional Law-First Amendment-Establishment ofReligion, 43 TENN. L. REV. 147 (1975).
5. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437 (1971); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH,
STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1977); Jones, Church v. State & the Supreme Court- The
Current Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 683 (1980); Note, Rebuilding
the Wall.* The Casefor a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (1981). For a discussion of the establishment clause and free exercise
clause, see infra note 76 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the
Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944);
Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943);
Note, General Laws, Neutral Princples, and the Free Exercise Clause, 33 VAND. L. REV. 149
(1980); see also infra note 76 and accompanying text.
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entanglement by the government with religious doctrine.7 In contrast, the
free exercise clause assures that an individual will not be forced to partici-
pate in religious practice or forgo the exercise of his right of religious
belief.8
The majority of the first amendment cases heard by the United States
Supreme Court have pertained to intrachurch property disputes, 9 state
statutes that directly or indirectly provide aid to religious organizations,' °
or efforts to conduct religious teaching in the public schools." The Court
has adopted different approaches to religion clause issues when interpret-
ing the amendment as a prohibition against government intervention in
religious doctrine and belief.'2 These approaches have included deferring
to church polity, 3 testing the dispute against provisions of state law,' 4 and
weighing the religious and societal interests at stake.' 5 Expanding upon
the approaches followed by the Supreme Court, the state courts have at-
tempted to apply these principles to religious disputes between private
individuals.6
7. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
8. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. For a review of the complexities of and
tensions between the clauses, see Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
9. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976);
Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); see also Ellman, Driven from the
Tribunal- Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1378, 1380 n.4
(1980); Note, Constitutional Guidelinesfor Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Arising
From Religious Schism, 45 Mo. L. REV. 518 (1980).
10. See, e.g., Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970); see also Note, Educational Vouchers.- Addressing the Establishment Clause Issue, 11
Pac. L.J. 1061 (1980).
11. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
12. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 429 U.S. 696 (1976);
Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396
U.S. 367 (1969); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). Deference to
church polity generally is discussed in cases dealing with intrachurch property disputes. The
Court has also referred, however, to the first amendment mandates requiring judicial nonin-
tervention whenever resolution of a dispute turns on the interpretation of religious doctrine.
See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
14. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 595. Discussion of this approach, which evaluates property
deeds and law, evolved from intrachurch property disputes.
15. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205. The balancing test generally is discussed where a gov-
ernment regulation in some way affects an individual's right of free exercise of belief; see
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (mandatory contribution to the federal social se-
curity system balanced against the religious beliefs of the individual). For a discussion of
the balancing test in Lee, see infra note 71 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., In Re Marriage of Hadeen, 27 Wash. App. 566, 619 P.2d 374 (1980) (cus-
19831
Catholic University Law Review
Disputes between a husband and wife regarding the enforcement of a
Jewish marriage document, the "Ketubah,"' 7 or the breach of a promise to
obtain a Jewish divorce, known as a "Get," have been addressed by the
state courts. 18 Courts have focused on constitutional and contractual ques-
tions to determine whether the religious provisions of the Ketubah are im-
mune from judicial construction or intervention, or if the Ketubah is a
legally recognized antenuptial agreement.' 9 By granting specific perform-
ance of a promise to obtain a religious divorce, the courts have raised
questions pertaining to the applicability of first amendment guarantees re-
garding religious practice and belief that are not ordinarily present with
enforcement of conventional secular agreements.2°
The New York Court of Appeals in Avitzur v. A vitzur 2' was presented
with the constitutional issues surrounding both the Ketubah and the Get.
The couple in A vitzur signed a Ketubah as part of their religious wedding
ceremony.22 Following civil divorce proceedings twelve years later, the
tody suit focused on mother's religious beliefs); Brillis v.. Brillis, 4 N.Y.2d 125, 149 N.E.2d
510, 173 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1958) (action for annulment based on spouse's failure to fulfill promise
to participate in a religious wedding ceremony).
17. See Minkin v. Minkin, 180 N.J. Super. 260, 434 A.2d 665 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1981). The Ketubah is a document signed by a couple during a Jewish marriage ceremony.
See infra note 22. Rubin v. Rubin, provides an explanation of the Ketubah derived from
English translations of the Talmud, the Jewish ecclesiastical law originally written in He-
brew. 75 Misc. 2d 776, 779-81, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64-66 (Fam. Ct. 1973). Briefly summarized,
marriage under Talmudic Law is described as a contract, given validity by the continued
contractual acts of the husband and wife. If the Ketubah, or marriage contract, ever leaves
the actual or constructive possession of the wife, further cohabitation is forbidden. Id
18. See, e.g., Minkin, 180 N.J. Super. at 260, 434 A.2d at 665; Rubin, 75 Misc. 2d at 779-
81, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 64-66. The Get was described in the Talmud as an act of release nor-
mally executed by the husband and delivered to the wife. The Bet Din, or rabbinical tribu-
nal, which decided matters of traditional Jewish law, could also be convened by the wife; the
wife would request the Bet Din to direct the husband to execute and deliver the Get. Once
the tribunal authorized severance of the marriage relationship, the wife was free to remarry.
19. The performance of an antenuptial or prenuptial agreement is conditioned upon the
occurrence of the marriage. Under law and public policy, the agreements are given the same
presumption of validity and are construed according to the same principles that govern other
contracts. The courts have liberally construed antenuptial agreements, giving effect to the
intention of the parties. See Gillilan v. Gillilan, 406 N.E.2d 981, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980);
Matter of Sunshine, 51 A.D.2d 326, 381 N.Y.S.2d 260 (App. Div.), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 875, 357
N.E.2d 999, 389 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1976); 1 A. LINDEY, ON SEPARATION AGREEMENTS & ANTE-
NUPTIAL CONTRACTS, § 270B (1982); Clark, Antenuplial Contracts, 50 U. COLO. L. REV.
141 (1979).
20. See Rubin, 75 Misc. 2d at 776, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 61 (promise to obtain a Get con-
tained in separation agreement); Margulies v. Margulies, 42 A.D.2d 517, 344 N.Y.S.2d (App.
Div. 1973) (promise to obtain a Get made by stipulation in open court).
21. 58 N.Y.2d 108, 446 N.E.2d 136, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W.
3262 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1983) (No. 82-1854).
22. The Ketubah signed by the Avitzurs reads as follows:
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wife commenced an action for specific performance of the provision in the
Ketubah that required the husband to appear before the religious tribunal,
the Bet Din, to obtain a Get. The wife could not remarry pursuant to
Jewish law without the religious divorce.23 The husband refused to appear
before the Bet Din and filed a motion to dismiss. He claimed that resolu-
tion of the suit was prohibited by the first amendment because it would
require the court to become excessively entangled in church doctrine.24
The Appellate Division for the New York Supreme Court overturned
the special term's denial of the husband's motion to dismiss. It distin-
guished Avitzur from previous cases in which a promise to obtain a reli-
gious divorce had been incorporated into conventional civil agreements.25
Justice Mahoney, writing for the majority, stated that the courts should not
enforce a liturgical agreement,26 and that the state, having already granted
The bridegroom made the following declaration to his bride: "Be thou my wife
according to the law of Moses and Israel. I shall honor and support thee, faithfully
I shall cherish thee and provide for thy needs, even as Jewish husbands are re-
quired to do by our religious law and tradition."
In turn, the bride took upon herself the duties of a Jewish wife, to honor and
cherish her husband, and to carry out all her obligations to him in faithfulness and
affection as Jewish law and tradition prescribe and in solemn assent to their mutual
responsibilities and love, the bridegroom and bride have declared: as evidence of
our desire to enable each other to live in accordance with the Jewish law of mar-
riage throughout our lifetime, we, the bride and bridegroom, attach our signatures
to this Ketubah, and hereby agree to recognize the Beth Din of the rabbinical as-
sembly and the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, or its duly appointed
representatives, as having authority to counsel us in the light of Jewish tradition
which requires husband and wife to give each other complete love and devotion,
and to summon either party at the request of the other, in order to enable the party
so requesting to live in accordance with the standards of the Jewish law of mar-
riage throughout his or her lifetime. We authorize the Beth Din to impose such
terms of compensation as it may see fit for failure to respond to its summons or to
carry out its decision. This Ketubah was executed and witnessed this day in ac-
cordance with Jewish law and tradition.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at Exhibit A, Avitzur v. Avitzur, 51 U.S.L.W. 3842 (U.S.
May 24, 1983) (No. 82-1854).
23. Avitzur v. Avitzur, 86 A.D.2d 133, 134, 449 N.Y.S.2d 83, 84 (App. Div. 1982), rev'd,
58 N.Y.2d 108, 109, 446 N.E.2d 136, 137, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, 573 (1983), cert. denied, 52
U.S.L.W. 3262 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1983) (No. 82-1854).
24. Id The husband argued that enforcement of the Ketubah's provisions would re-
quire the court to unconstitutionally construe the meaning or significance of church
doctrine.
25. Avitzur, 86 A.D.2d at 134, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 84 (distinguishing Waxstein v. Waxstein,
90 Misc. 2d 784, 395 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sp. Term), aft'd, 57 A.D.2d 863, 394 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App.
Div. 1977); Margulies v. Margulies, 42 A.D.2d at 517, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 482; Rubin v. Rubin,
75 Misc. 2d at 776, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 61; Koeppel v. Koeppel, 138 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sp. Term
1954), aft'd, 3 A.D.2d 853, 161 N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div. 1957)).
26. Justice Mahoney's reference to "liturgical" agreements distinguishes civil agree-
ments, i.e., completely outside religious circumstances or ceremony, from agreements that
1983]
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the parties a civil divorce, had no further interest in the matter.27 Justice
Levine, in his dissent, noted that the couple voluntarily signed the
Ketubah triggering application of civil contract principles. He reasoned
that enforcement of the promise to obtain a religious divorce did not entail
participation in a religious ceremony, and that the husband's refusal to
honor his promise prevented the wife from remarrying in accordance with
her religious beliefs.
28
The New York Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the husband to
specifically perform his promise to obtain a Get.29 Judge Wachtler, writ-
ing for the court, conceded that provisions of the document referring to
religious laws were not enforceable. He maintained, however, that the
provision requiring the parties to appear before the religious tribunal in
matters concerning their marriage was analogous to an arbitration clause
in an antenuptial agreement. 30 The court applied principles of contract
law to the provision of the Ketubah. Judge Wachtler noted that the
Supreme Court had resolved intrachurch property disputes by using prin-
ciples of property law that did not necessitate inquiry into church doc-
trine.3 ' He reasoned, therefore, that A vitzur could be decided without
litigating doctrinal issues by similarly using secular principles of law.3 2
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Jones agreed with the majority that in spe-
cific instances religious disputes could be resolved without interpretation
of religious doctrine, thereby complying with first amendment limita-
tions.33 Judge Jones disagreed, however, that secular law could be applied
to provisions extracted from a religious document.34 According to the dis-
sent, determination of the husband's obligations under the Ketubah could
not be accomplished without inquiry into Jewish law and tradition, which
are entered into as part of a religious ceremony, professing to be "executed and witnessed
. . . in accordance with Jewish law and tradition." Avitzur, 86 A.D.2d at 135, 449 N.Y.S.2d
at 84.
27. Id
28. Id at 135-36, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
29. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d at 115-16, 446 N.E.2d at 139, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
30. Id at 113-14, 446 N.E.2d at 138, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 574 (citing Bowmer v. Bowmer, 50
N.Y.2d 288, 406 N.E.2d 760, 428 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1980) (judicial recognition of arbitration
clauses incorporated into separation agreements)). Bowmer noted that an arbitration clause
gave the parties the opportunity to choose someone they both felt was well qualified to
resolve disputes. The court also observed that arbitration was informal, expedient, and less
costly than litigation. Id at 293, 406 N.E.2d at 761-62, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 904-05.
31. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d at 114-15,446 N.E.2d at 138, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 574 (citing Jones v.
Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979)).
32. Avizur, 58 N.Y.2d at 115-16, 446 N.E.2d at 138-39, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
33. Id, 446 N.E.2d at 139, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 576 (Jones, J., dissenting).
34. Id
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is prohibited by the religion clause.35
This Note will analyze the principles applied by the Avitzur court to
compel specific performance of a promise contained in a Jewish marriage
document. Particular emphasis will be given to the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation and application of the first amendment's religion clause. The
Note will also review how state courts have resolved first amendment is-
sues in contract disputes that primarily involve judicial enforcement of the
Ketubah or civil agreements to obtain a Get. An evaluation of the A vitzur
decision will indicate that the courts are in need of Supreme Court direc-
tion to resolve religious disputes arising between individuals. Finally, the
Note will conclude with an analysis ofA vitzur's impact on future litigation
concerning religious practice and doctrine.
I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSE
A. Supreme Court-Parameters of the First Amendment Defined
The rules defining the meaning and scope of the first amendment's reli-
gion clause evolved from the decision by the United States Supreme Court
in Watson v. Jones .36 The Watson Court addressed the role of the civil
courts in resolving an intrachurch property dispute that arose between two
factions of a local congregation.37 The Court denied civil court interven-
tion, emphasizing that the first amendment had secured religious liberty
from interference by the government.3 8 According to the Court, when
members of the church body united, they implicitly consented to be bound
by its government. The Court reasoned that this consent and the ability of
the church to structure its own government would be meaningless if deci-
sions made by church governing bodies could be appealed to the secular
courts. 39 It therefore concluded that deference must be given to the deci-
sionmakers within the church."
35. Id. at 119-21, 446 N.E.2d at 141-42, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 577-78.
36. 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 679 (1872). Watson was a diversity case, decided prior to judicial
recognition that the first amendment was applicable to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment. See Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445 n.4 (1969).
37. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) at 726-30.
38. Id.
39. Id at 728-29.
40. Id The Watson Court stated:
[T]he rule of action which should govern the civil courts. . . is, that, whenever the
questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been
decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been
carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on
them, in their application to the case before them.
Id at 727.
1983]
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First amendment principles were again applied to an intrachurch prop-
erty dispute in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church (Hull Church).41 The Supreme Court addressed
whether a state court could determine if one faction of a church had de-
parted from the tenets of faith, thereby justifying the possession of church
property by the other faction.42 The Court held that the state court could
not base a decision on its own interpretation of church doctrine and the
significance the court assigned to that doctrine.43 It recognized the state's
interest in resolving property disputes but reaffirmed the principles stated
in Watson v. Jones that the secular courts must defer to church polity."
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan maintained that Watson left the
courts no role in determining the ecclesiastical questions presented in Hull
Church .4" He did assert, however, that there are circumstances when lim-
ited review of ecclesiastical determinations would be appropriate.46 He
maintained that not all intrachurch disputes over property jeopardize first
amendment values and introduced the use of "neutral principles of law" to
resolve intrachurch property disputes.47 This approach, which uses state
property laws to resolve the controversy,48 was carefully distinguished
41. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
42. Id at 441
43. Id. at 451-52. In its conclusion that the first amendment required nonintervention
by the courts in intrachurch property disputes, the Hull Church Court stated: "In this coun-
try the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle,
and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property,
and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all." Id at 446 (quoting Watson
v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 728-29 (1872)).
44. Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 445.
45. Id. at 447. In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, decided after Hull
Church, the Court noted that the Watson rule requiring deference to religious tribunals was
mandated by the first amendment. Serbian, 426 U.S. 696, 712 (1976) (citing Maryland &
Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367, 369
n.3 (1970); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969); Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115-16 (1952)).
46. Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 447. Justice Brennan was referring to Gonzalez v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929). The Supreme Court in Gonzalez refused
to order the appointment to a chaplaincy that was claimed under a will providing for the
placement. Id at 16. In dictum, the Court stated that "[iun the absence of fraud, collusion
or arbitrariness" decisions by religious tribunals regarding ecclesiastical matters must be
accepted by the courts. Id Although the Court in Gonzalez introduced an exception to the
rule that required deference to ecclesiastical authority, the exception was not applicable to
the facts presented in Gonzalez. As noted by the Court in Serbian, the Supreme Court has
never applied the exception. 426 U.S. at 712.
47. Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 449.
48. Later in the same year, the Supreme Court denied appeal of a state court's resolu-
tion of an intrachurch property dispute for lack of a federal question. The Court reasoned
that the controversy involved no inquiry into religious doctrine and that state law could be
applied to the dispute. Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God at Sharpsburg,
[Vol. 33:219
Judicially Enforcing Religious Agreements
from litigation that requires courts to resolve controversy over religious
doctrine and practice and is prohibited by the first amendment.49
In 1979, the Supreme Court officially approved the use of the "neutral
principles of law" approach in intrachurch property disputes.50 In Jones v.
Wolf, 5 a controversy over the ownership of church property arose follow-
ing a schism in a local church. The Georgia Supreme Court, presented
with the issue of which faction of the formerly united congregation was
entitled to the church property,5 2 adopted the "neutral principles" ap-
proach and evaluated state property statutes.53 The Supreme Court, with
four justices dissenting, affirmed the state court's resolution of the dis-
396 U.S. 367, 367-68 (1970). Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, expanded on the
"neutral principles of law" approach he had introduced in Hull Church, and explained the
parameters of its use. In applying this approach, Justice Brennan asserted that the courts
could study statutes, deeds and other related documents in order to resolve intrachurch
property disputes. If the application of secular law, however, required resolution of doctri-
nal issues, Justice Brennan emphasized that deference must be given to the religious tribu-
nals. Id He further emphasized that when a secular court inquires into religious doctrine, it
risks inhibiting the free development of the doctrine. Id
49. Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 449. The Supreme Court was again called upon to resolve
an intrachurch property dispute in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696 (1976). The Court held that a state court's adjudication of a dispute over the con-
trol of a diocese's property, which involved detailed review of conflicting testimony regard-
ing internal church procedures and doctrine, unconstitutionally interfered with ecclesiastical
decisions. Id. at 718. Justice Brennan, relying upon Watson, Gonzalez, and Hull Church,
stated that the "neutral principles" approach was not applicable in a decision that depended
on the resolution of internal church matters and ambiguous church law. 1d. at 721. He
reasoned that inquiries into church polity necessitated interpretation of religious law and
might result in a court substituting its own interpretation of the religious doctrine for the
interpretation adopted by the church. Id In a dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted
that factual inquiry was required in the resolution of any conflicting claims. According to
the dissent, the court's inquiry into intrachurch disputes did not necessarily mean that the
court was expressing doctrinal preference. Id at 726 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see infra
note 91. Justice Rehnquist expressed concern that the majority in Serbian was divesting the
courts of any authority to resolve intrachurch disputes and that the immunity granted to the
churches could foster lawlessness within their organizations. Serbian, 426 U.S. at 734
(Rehnquist J., dissenting).
50. The "neutral principles" approach initially evolved from a state adjudication of an
intrachurch property dispute in Georgia that was discussed by the Court in Hull Church as a
potentially workable approach to these disputes. 393 U.S. at 440. The concept was refined
by the Georgia Supreme Court in Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322, cert. denied,
429 U.S. 868 (1976); see Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of
God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367, 367-68 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also supra
note 48 and accompanying text.
51. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
52. Id at 597-602. The property in question was in the name of a local church that was
a member of a larger hierarchical body. A majority of the local church's members voted to
split with the general church and retained possession of the church property. The minority
members brought this action to state court to regain title of the property. Id. at 597-600.
53. Id. at 599-604. The court awarded legal title to the majority faction after examining
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pute. 4 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, expanded upon the ap-
proach discussed in Hull Church and stated that a state court was free to
resolve church property disputes as long as the court's review does not
involve consideration of doctrinal matter, rituals, or tenets of faith.55 The
Court carefully noted that deference to ecclesiastical tribunals is constitu-
tionally mandated when disputes revolve around the questions of religious
doctrine and practice.56 Justice Blackmun reasoned that the "neutrality
principle" is completely secular in operation because it relies on objective
concepts of property law.5 7 He proceeded to list the advantages of this
approach, stating that the "neutral principles" approach is flexible enough
to accommodate all forms of religious organization and, that by ordering
private rights and obligations, the court's decisions would reflect the par-
ties' intentions. 8 The Court cautioned that any evaluation of religious
documents must be done solely on secular terms. If a document incorpo-
rated religious concepts requiring interpretation, a court must defer resolu-
tion of the issue to the authoritative ecclesiastical body.59
the property deeds. It determined that the local church, which the court reasoned was repre-
sented by the majority, held valid title to the property. Id
54. ld at 602-04.
55. ld at 602. See Reardon v. Lemoyne, 122 N.H. 1042, 454 A.2d 428 (1982). Three
teachers and the principal of a parochial school challenged the refusal by the bishop and
school board to grant them a termination hearing as provided for in their employment con-
tract. Id at 1044-47, 454 A.2d at 430-31. The New Hampshire Supreme Court discussed
whether the court had jurisdiction over the parochial school and church officials. In grant-
ing jurisdiction, the court noted that the constitution prohibited the court's intervention in
religious disputes involving doctrinal issues. The court asserted, however, that the first
amendment had not granted religious entities total immunity. ld at 1047, 454 A.2d at 431.
According to the court, jurisdiction could be granted over religious controversies involving
property or contractual rights that are not influenced by doctrinal issues. Id Justice Bois,
writing for the court, reasoned that it was unfair to deny access to the courts to parties who
had voluntarily entered into civil contracts. Id, 454 A.2d at 432. Using the "neutral princi-
ples of law" approach derived from Jones v. Wolf, the court explained that provisions of a
contract could be evaluated without interfering with religious doctrine. Id at 1047-48, 454
A.2d at 432 (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979)).
56. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602; see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
57. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603. Justice Blackmun asserted that the "neutral principles" ap-
proach did not inhibit free exercise of religion. According to the majority, this approach
could be used for resolution of intrachurch disputes in the same manner that provisions of
state law could be applied to govern how churches owned property or hired employees. Id
at 606.
58. Id at 603.
59. ld at 604; see generally Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal- Judicial Resolution of
Internal Church Disputes, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1378 (1981). EUman has cautioned that the
contractual interests and religious freedoms of the church's members might be sacrified
when courts refuse to adjudicate religious disputes. Id at 1383. Ellman discussed four rea-
sons why internal church agreements should be enforced. First, enforcement is consistent
with an individual's expectations and sense of justice. Second, as stated above, the religious
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Justice Powell, writing for the dissent, expressed concern that the "neu-
tral principles" approach would produce increased involvement by the
courts in church controversies. 60 He reasoned that deference to church
polity was required to ensure that courts do not entangle themselves in
religious doctrine. Without such restraint, the dissent concluded that
courts would become unconstitutionally involved in supporting or over-
turning the resolution of disputes by church governing bodies.6 '
The Court's attention in Cantwell v. Connecticut,62 moved from "neutral
principles" and deference to church polity to the constitutionality of gov-
ernment regulations when reviewing state statutes that allegedly affect in-
dividuals' first amendment rights. The Court declared unconstitutional an
ordinance that gave public officials discretion to deny licenses for the solic-
itation of funds if the officials determined that the solicitation was not for a
"religious cause."' 63 The Court agreed, however, that an individual's con-
duct related to religious matters could be regulated in some instances. 6 It
distinguished between the freedom to believe, which is absolute, and the
freedom to act, which is presumed, but more dependent on the surround-
ing circumstances.65 Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, explained that
the freedom to act is subject to regulation for the protection of society as
long as the regulation does not unduly infringe upon this freedom.6 6
In Wisconsin v. Yoder 67 the Supreme Court introduced a balancing test
to determine which claims against state statutes invoked protection of the
freedoms of church members are protected. Third, the recognition of enforceable contracts
facilitates the operation of complex organizations. Finally, the enforcement of agreements
implements the parties' intention. Id at 1402-04. If the contract is vague and requires inter-
pretation by religious authorities who are divided on the issue, it may not be possible to
construe the terms of the agreement with enough certainty to permit resolution of the dis-
pute. Id at 1417.
60. Jones, 443 U.S. at 611 (Powell, J., dissenting).
61. Id at 614-17. Contra Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 726-28 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
62. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
63. Id at 303.
64. id at 303-04.
65. Id
66. Id. at 304; see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see generally McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). The Supreme Court stated that a statute disqualifying ministers
from serving as delegates to a state constitutional convention was directed at conduct, not
religious belief, and therefore did not interfere with the freedom of belief. Id. at 626-27
(citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)) (distinguishing between conduct and be-
lief). The Court concluded, however, that the statutory disqualification did violate the right
to free exercise of religion because it conditioned the right on the surrender of the right to
seek office. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 627-29. The Court reasoned that the freedom of belief
was predicated on the freedom to practice that belief. Id.
67. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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free exercise clause. Amish parents challenged a state ordinance requiring
school attendance until age sixteen as an interference with the exercise of
their religion.68 The Court held that the state could not compel the parents
to send children to school who had completed the eighth grade.69 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court balanced the state's interest in main-
taining an educational system against the fundamental right to free exer-
cise of religious beliefs.7" Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
explained that the religion clause does not, however, permit individuals to
fashion standards of conduct based on personal preference and to under-
mine compelling governmental interests.7 '
In Everson v. Board of Education, 72 the Supreme Court shifted its atten-
tion to the establishment clause of the first amendment. The Court held73
that a state statute authorizing reimbursement of bus fares paid by chil-
dren attending parochial schools did not violate the first amendment
clause that prohibits any "law respecting an establishment of religion."74
In its discussion of activity that violates the clause, the Everson Court
noted that the government could not force a person to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion or compel or prohibit church attendance. 75 Ac-
cording to the Court, both federal and state governments are foreclosed
from establishing a church or passing laws that give preference to one reli-
68. Id at 213.
69. Id at 215-16.
70. Id The same year that Wisconsin v. Yoder was decided, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit balanced government and religious interests in EEOC v. Pa-
cific Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982). The employee in Pacofc Press filed an
employment discrimination suit against a religious affiliated publishing house. The pub-
lisher responded by terminating the individual, claiming that church doctrine prohibited
suits against the church by its members. Id at 1280. The publisher, relying on Serbian,
claimed that the EEOC could not maintain a cause of action against the religious organiza-
tion because the court could not review ecclesiastical decisions. Id at 1281. The court held
that in this instance application of the employment discrimination laws did not violate the
first amendment. Id The court reasoned that although the action imposed liability on the
religious organization for disciplinary actions based in religious doctrine, the compelling
government interests overrode the religious concerns. Id
71. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16. Chief Justice Burger noted that claims resting on reli-
gious beliefs must be rooted in deep religious convictions. The Court has, however, recog-
nized compelling government interests over legitimate claims based on the free exercise
clause. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (government interest in maintenance
of the social security system required contributions by members of Amish religion although
doing so interfered with free exercise of belief).
72. 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (property tax
exemptions to religious organizations do not favor or sponsor religion in violation of the first
amendment).
73. The Court in Everson was split in a 5-4 decision.
74. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17; see supra note 72.
75. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
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gion over another.76
The current approach for evaluating state regulations, which focuses on
the first amendment's establishment clause, was discussed in Committeefor
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist." The Court upheld a
challenge to state financial aid to parochial schools.7 8 It articulated a three
prong test to determine the limits imposed by the religion clause on gov-
ernment action.79 First, to be constitutionally valid, the law must reflect a
secular, or nonsectarian, legislative purpose.80 Second, the law's primary
effect must neither advance nor inhibit reli&ion. 1 Third, the statute must
avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. 2 Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Burger concluded that the statute fostered excessive
entanglement between church and state.8 3 He explained that although the
legislative purpose in preserving a healthy and safe educational environ-
ment was fully secular, the primary effect of the statute advanced religion
by directly subsidizing the religious activities of parochial schools.8 4
In addition to first amendment limitations on government regulations,
the Court has also discussed the effect of the religion clause on the contrac-
tual obligations of religious organizations. In United Methodist Church v.
76. Id. at 15. The interrelations of the establishment clause and the free exercise clause
were discussed in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The Court noted the dual nature of
the first amendment in its rejection of a state law requiring the recitation of an official state
prayer in public schools. Id at 430. Justice Black, writing for the majority, compared the
free exercise and establishment clauses, and noted that although they overlapped they were
in fact different. Justice Black asserted that the free exercise clause, which protects against
the regulation of an individual's religious beliefs, differs from the establishment clause,
which does not depend upon a showing of direct government compulsion. Id. at 430. He
emphasized that the establishment clause could be violated by the enactment of laws that
tend to establish an official religion. Id at 431; see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
For a description of the dual nature of the first amendment, see In re Marriage of Hadeen,
27 Wash. App. 566, 619 P.2d 374, 379 (1980) (establishment clause guarantees government
neutrality in religious matters while the free exercise clause recognizes an individual's liberty
in religion).
77. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
78. Id at 772 (statute granted financial aid to parochial schools in the form of mainte-
nance and repair grants, tuition reimbursement grants, and income tax benefits). But cf.
Mueller v. Allen, 51 U.S.L.W. 5050 (U.S. June 28, 1983) (state statute allowing taxpayers to
deduct expenses incurred for tuition payments to parochial schools does not violate the first
amendment's religion clause).
79. The Supreme Court had introduced the three prong test two years earlier in Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
80. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)).
81. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773 (citing School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963)).
82. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
83. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773-74.
84. Id.
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Superior Court of California, 85 the Court declined to expand the scope of
first amendment protections to a suit against a religious organization for
breach of contract 86 in its management of retirement homes.87 The reli-
gious organization claimed that the first amendment prevents the courts
from inquiring into the operation of a hierarchical church.88 In discussing
the constitutional issues raised by United Methodist, Justice Rehnquist re-
ferred to the limits imposed by the Constitution in intrachurch disputes.
He noted, however, that the Court had never suggested that these limits be
applied outside the context of intrachurch disputes.89 The Court refused
to recognize the danger of judicial support of a particular belief" where
fraud or breach of contract is alleged.9
B. State Courts'Applications
An early case that recognized the Ketubah as a civilly enforceable con-
tract was Hurwitz v. Hurwitz.92 A widow, defending an action to eject her
from the family residence, based her right of possession on provisions con-
85. 439 U.S. 1369 (1978). The Court's opinion primarily dealt with procedural issues
raised by United Methodist's application for a stay of state court proceedings pending
Supreme Court determination of its petition for writ of certiorari. The Court denied the
application for stay, stating that it was unlikely certiorari would be granted. Id. at 1374.
86. Fraud and statutory violations were also alleged against United Methodist. Id at
1373.
87. Id at 1369.
88. Id at 1372.
89. Id at 1372-73. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, Chief Justice Burger discussed the Court's
attempts to define the scope of first amendment prohibitions. He cautioned that a decision
from any one case that prohibits interference with first amendment guarantees may sweep
too broadly outside its own facts. 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). The Chief Justice emphasized
that the amendment was not a statutory prohibition against all church and state relation-
ships but instead ensured neutrality by the government. Id. at 669; see McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618, 618 n.7 (1978).
90. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
91. United Methodist, 439 U.S. at 1373. Any disputes involving religious matters argua-
bly entail some degree of the court's entanglement in religion. In intrachurch disputes,
where one faction of the church is requesting adjudication, the court's involvement may
violate the establishment clause. When secular issues are presented, however, the courts are
able to refer to contract laws and principles. Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal- Judicial
Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1378, 1382 (1981).
See Lexington Theological Seminary, Inc. v. Vance, 596 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
In Lexington, the seminary denied a degree to Vance after he voluntarily admitted that he
was a homosexual. Id at 12. The Kentucky Court of Appeals judicially recognized the
seminary's admission catalog as a contract and addressed the issue of whether the contract
had been breached. ld at 11-14. The seminary's denial of Vance's degree was upheld.
Because the case could be decided on a contractual basis, the court noted that it was unnec-
essary to inquire into whether an order compelling the seminary to issue a degree would
have violated the religion clause of the first amendment. Id.
92. 216 A.D. 362, 215 N.Y.S. 184 (App. Div. 1926).
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tained within the Ketubah. 93 Denying plaintiffs motion for judgment on
the pleadings,94 the Appellate Division for the New York Supreme Court
distinguished those provisions in the Ketubah that referred to the laws of
Moses and Israel from the section of the document that entitled the widow
to possession of the family home.95 The court instructed the special term
to test the provisions of the Ketubah relating to the widow's property rights
under state law. If the provisions were not found contrary to law, the court
asserted that the intention of the parties should be enforced. 96
Enforcement of an individual's breach of promise to obtain a religious
divorce was discussed by the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court in Margulies v. Margulies.97 The husband in Margulies
failed to comply with a stipulation during civil divorce proceedings to ob-
tain a Get, and was incarcerated for contempt of court.98 The court held
that the husband could not be imprisoned for future refusals to obtain the
Get.99 It did, however, approve the imposition of fines for continued re-
fusal to honor the stipulation, noting that the husband had voluntarily
agreed to the Get and, in doing so, knew the consequences of his act.' °°
93. Id at 363, 215 N.Y.S. at 185.
94. The plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings was based on the contention
that the Ketubah was not recognized in law and therefore did not constitute a sufficient
defense to plaintiffs complaint. Id at 364, 215 N.Y.S. at 186. The Appellate Division for
the New York Supreme Court denied the motion, stating that the case should be tried on its
merits to determine whether or not the relevant provisions of the Ketubah were in accord
with the state laws. Id at 366, 215 N.Y.S. at 188.
95. Id. at 365, 215 N.Y.S. at 187. The court failed to explain how the provision of the
Ketubah relating to property rights could be extracted from a document that as a whole
made reference to religious laws. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
96. Id at 367, 215 N.Y.S. at 188; see Prebble, Choice of Law to Determine the Validity
and Effect of Contracts .4 Comparison of English and American Approaches to the Conflict of
Laws, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (1973).
97. 42 A.D.2d 517, 344 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App. Div. 1973).
98. Id at 517, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
99. Id Both the majority and dissent noted that a Jewish divorce could only be granted
if sought willingly. Therefore, a divorce obtained by compulsion of the court would not be
valid. Id at 517, 518, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85 (Nunez, J., dissenting) (citing 6 ENCYCLOPE-
DIA JUDAICA 130 (1975).
100. Margulies, 42 A.D.2d at 517, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85. In a subsequent decision by
the same court, it was noted that Margulies raised, but failed to settle, the issue of whether a
civil court could compel a party to get a religious divorce. Waxstein v. Waxstein, 57 A.D.2d
863, 394 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 1977) (construing Margulies v. Margulies, 42 A.D.2d 517,
344 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App. Div. 1973)). The court in Waxstein suggested that Margulies infer-
entially compelled specific performance by giving the husband the option to pay a fine or to
comply with the stipulation to obtain a Get. Waxstein, 57 A.D.2d at 863, 394 N.Y.S.2d at
253.
Questions regarding the court's authority to compel a person to obtain a Get were also
raised in Koeppel P. Koeppel, 3 A.D.2d 853, 161 N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div. 1957). During an
action for annulment, a couple signed an agreement whereby the husband agreed to obtain a
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Judge Nunez, in a dissenting opinion, disagreed with the imposition of the
fine. He contended that fulfilling the promise involved participation in
religious ceremonies and procedures that were matters of personal convic-
tion and could not be compelled by specific performance.10 '
The New York Family Court in Rubin v. Rubin'02 decided the enforce-
ability of a promise to obtain a Get contained in a separation agreement.
The separation agreement conditioned payments of support and alimony
to the wife upon her consent to obtain a Get. 03 The court allowed the
husband to withhold the support payments until he secured his former
wife's consent."° In a decision that outlined the historical significance of
the Ketubah and the Get, 0 5 the court distinguished Rubin from Watson v.
Jones. The court recognized that Watson enjoined the courts from adjudi-
cating disputes that interfered with decisions made by religious tribu-
nals."0 6 The court reasoned, however, that enforcement of the agreement
in Rubin did not raise issues of separation of church and state. Instead, the
court asserted that its holding was simply a recognition of the parties' ex-
pectations under the separation agreement.'0 7
A New York court was again asked to recognize the Ketubah as a valid
contract in In re Estate of White."°8 This time, unlike the court in Hur-
Jewish divorce "whenever it shall become necessary." Id at 853, 161 N.Y.S.2d 695. The
Special Term for the New York Supreme Court enforced the contract and noted that com-
pliance with the agreement was not equivalent to a requirement that the husband participate
in religious practice. Koeppel v. Koeppel, 138 N.Y.S.2d 366, 373 (Sp. Term 1954). The
appellate division reversed, holding that the husband could not be forced to obtain the Get.
Koeppel, 3 A.D.2d at 853, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 695. In a memorandum opinion, the court rea-
soned that the language of the contract was too indefinite to determine what circumstances
would satisfy a finding that the divorce was "necessary." The court also indicated that the
wife had already been remarried by a rabbi. Id It can be inferred that had the provisions
of the contract been clearer, and the need for the Get more apparent, the court would have
compelled specific performance of the promise.
101. Margulies, 42 A.D.2d at 518, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (Nunez, J., dissenting).
102. 75 Misc. 2d 776, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Fain. Ct. 1973).
103. Id at 778, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
104. Id at 783, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
105. See supra notes 17 and 18.
106. Rubin, 75 Misc. 2d at 782, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
107. Id; see Waxstein v. Waxstein, 90 Misc. 2d 784, 395 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sp. Term), aft'd,
57 A.D.2d 863, 394 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 1977) and supra note 100. The Special Term
for the New York Supreme Court compelled a husband to obtain a Get as promised in a
separation agreement. The court reasoned that the agreement was a lawful contract and
should be enforced to carry out the intention of the parties. Id at 785-89, 395 N.Y.S.2d at
879-81. The court also explained that specific performance could be compelled if the rem-
edy at law for breach of contract was inadequate. Id at 879; see also infra note 116 and
accompanying text.
108. 78 Misc. 2d 157, 356 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sur. Ct. 1974).
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witz, 1 ° 9 the New York Surrogate Court declined to recognize the provi-
sions in a Ketubah as conferring property rights on either party. Prior to
their marriage, the couple in White had signed an agreement whereby the
wife waived all rights of election against her husband's will. During their
wedding ceremony, the husband and wife signed a Ketubah that the wife
claimed cancelled the prior antenuptial agreement and gave her, as her
husband's widow, the right of election."° The surrogate court recognized
the Ketubah strictly as a ceremonial document. The court held that be-
cause the document was not a civil contract that granted rights to the par-
ties, it did not have a binding effect on their property rights as governed by
state law."'
The issues surrounding the enforcement of a Ketubah and the authority
of the courts to compel specific performance of a promise to obtain a Get
were harmonized in Minkin v. Minkin." 2 Following the couple's civil di-
vorce, the New Jersey Superior Court compelled the husband to secure a
Jewish divorce in accordance with the provisions of the couple's
Ketubah." 3 Judge Minuskin, writing for the court, explained that the
courts would enforce a contract between a husband and wife as long as the
contract was not contrary to public policy." 4 The court described the
Ketubah as a document outlining reciprocal obligations between a hus-
109. 216 A.D. at 362, 215 N.Y.S. at 184.
110. White, 78 Misc. 2d at 158-59, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 209-10. The provision in the Ketubah
referred to by the claimant stated that "in view of thy widowhood" the wife shall receive
"100 zuzim." Id at 158, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
111. Id at 159, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 209. The court suggested that the use of the Ketubah as
a binding document had vanished with state law recognition of married women's rights:
In modern times, especially in the more civilized countries where the law of the
land protects married women with respect to their property rights, the ketubah as a
bond on indebtedness has become almost obsolete .... Moreover, practically
nowhere does the law of the land accord to the Rabbinical ketubah the force of a
lien on the husband's property, real or personal. Thus, even for the observant and
the orthodox, the ketubah has become more a matter of form and a ceremonial
document than a legal obligation.
Id at 159, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 210 (quoting G. HOROWITz, THE SPIRIT OF THE JEWISH LAW, §
176 (1973)).
112. 180 N.J. Super. 260, 434 A.2d 665 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981).
113. Id at 266, 434 A.2d at 668.
114. Minkin, 180 N.J. Super. at 262-63, 434 A.2d at 666. The Minkin court cited in-
stances when a contract between spouses would not be enforced. The court noted that con-
tracts contrary to public policy included those that were injurious to public interests,
violated state laws, were against good morals, or interfered with public welfare or safety. Id
(citing Garlinger v. Garlinger, 129 N.J. Super. 37, 322 A.2d 190 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974));
see Pamiawski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 359 A.2d 719 (1976). An antenuptial
agreement in Parniawski precluded either spouse from seeking alimony or any part of the
estate owned by the other partner prior to their marriage. The Superior Court in Connecti-
cut held that the antenuptial agreement was against public policy and superseded the statu-
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band and wife that promoted a successful marital relationship. Judge
Minuskin emphasized that enforcement of the Ketubah simply required
the husband to do what he had agreed to do.' 15 The court expressed con-
cern that if the husband were allowed to renounce his promise to obtain a
Get, the wife would be prevented from remarrying in accordance with her
religious beliefs.I16
The court also considered whether the order compelling the husband to
obtain a Get infringed upon his first amendment free exercise rights. It
found that enforcement of the Ketubah's provisions complied with the
three prong test presented by the Supreme Court in Nyquist. 7 To apply
the test,1 1 8 the court called upon four rabbis versed in Jewish law." 9 The
rabbis described the Ketubah as a civil contract.120 They agreed that ob-
taining a Get did not involve a religious ceremony and explained that the
parties were not required to state any creeds or acknowledge any religion
during the procedures.12 ' The rabbis considered the Get to be a severance
of a contractual relation between a married couple that was concerned
solely with the wife's right to remarry.' 22 The court, therefore, concluded
that its ruling did not interfere with the husband's right of free exercise of
belief or violate the first amendment's prohibition against excessive entan-
glement with religion.
1 23
tory power of the court. Id at 720; see generally Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL
L.Q. 365, 373 (1921).
115. Minkin, 180 N.J. Super. at 262-63, 434 A.2d at 666.
116. Id.," see generally Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity
andthe Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (1981) (specific performance should be
granted because money damages cannot compensate a party seeking a religious divorce).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981) (contract remedies protect parties'
expectations, placing them where they would have been had the contract not been
breached); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 (1981) (specific performance is
available when damages are unavailable).
117. Minkin, 180 N.J. Super. at 264, 434 A.2d at 667; see supra notes 80-82 and accompa-
nying text.
118. The court did not, however, analyze or explain how it applied each prong of the
Nyquist test to the facts of this case. Nor was it explained why the test, which was used by
the Supreme Court to determine whether a statute violated the establishment clause, was
applicable to Minkin.
119. The credentials of the rabbis were listed by the court. Minkin, 180 N.J. Super. at
264 n.4, 434 A.2d at 667 n.4.
120. Id at 265-66, 434 A.2d at 663; see supra note 111 and accompanying text for a
description of the Ketubah as a ceremonial document.
121. Minkin, 180 N.J. Super. at 265-66, 434 A.2d at 667. A fifth rabbi, called upon by the
husband, concluded that the procedures to obtain a Get constituted a religious act. The
court appeared to reject the rabbi's testimony when he admitted he was not as knowledgea-
ble about Jewish law as the other rabbis present. Id at 266, 434 A.2d at 668.
122. Id at 265-66, 434 A.2d at 667.
123. Id
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II. AtvITZUR . AVTZUR
A. Civil Enforcement of a Religious Agreement
Two years after Minkin v. Minkin, the New York Court of Appeals in
A vitzur v. A vitzur12 4 was asked to enforce a provision in a Ketubah that
required a husband to appear before the rabbinical tribunal to obtain a
religious divorce. 125 The court considered the role of the civil courts in the
adjudication of matters that involve religious concerns, 26 and specifically
enforced the provisions of the Ketubah. 27 The court did so, however,
without thoroughly analyzing the various approaches used by other courts
to address the first amendment issues.'
28
The court of appeals' decision in Avitzur reversed the appellate divi-
sion's determination that the courts did not have jurisdiction to enforce the
provisions of the marriage document. 29 The appellate division focused on
the religion clause issues raised by the enforcement of the Ketubah rather
than those issues related to the specific performance of a Get. 130 Justice
Mahoney, writing for the appellate division, reasoned that the Ketubah
was a liturgical agreement because it had been signed during a religious
ceremony, and by its own terms stated it was executed in accordance with
Jewish law.' 3 ' Justice Mahoney warned against the precedent of allowing
civil enforcement of religious covenants but did not explain what the im-
plications might be.' 32
Justice Levine, dissenting in the appellate division, maintained that
there had been a meeting of the minds between the parties to the Ketubah
and viewed the document as a valid antenuptial agreement. 133 He referred
to Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 34 which upheld selected provisions of the Ketubah
as contractual agreements, and stated that the provisions should be en-
forced to effectuate the intent of the parties.13' Justice Levine reasoned
124. 58 N.Y.2d at 108, 446 N.E.2d at 136, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 572, cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W.
3262 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1983) (No. 82-1854).
125. Id at 111-12, 446 N.E.2d at 137, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
126. Id at, 111, 446 N.E.2d at 136, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
127. Id. at 116, 446 N.E.2d at 139, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
128. Id at 114-15, 446 N.E.2d at 138, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
129. 86 A.D.2d at 134-35, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
130. Id The court distinguishedAvitzur from those cases in which the promise to obtain
a Get was found in civil agreements. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
131. Avitzur, 86 A.D.2d at 134, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
132. Id
133. Id. at 136, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 85 (Levine, J., dissenting).
134. 216 A.D. 362, 215 N.Y.S. 184 (App. Div. 1926).
135. Ayitzur, 86 A.D.2d at 136, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 85 (Levine, J., dissenting) (citing H-ur-
witz, 216 A.D. at 366, 215 N.Y.S. at 184).
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that the husband merely had to appear before a rabbi and execute the Get
document. He asserted that the husband's refusal to do so deprived the
other party to the agreement of the free exercise of her beliefs.' 36 Coun-
tering the majority's concern that dangerous precedent would be set by
enforcing the agreement, the dissent suggested that granting civil court im-
munity to every agreement made during a religious ceremony would pre-
clude enforcement of valid contractual promises.
137
The court of appeals rejected the reasoning of the appellate division and
held that the secular terms contained within the Ketubah were capable of
judicial enforcement. 38 It addressed the husband's claim that the obliga-
tions imposed by the Ketubah arose from ecclesiastical law and could only
be interpreted by an inquiry into religious doctrine and practice that was
prohibited by the religion clause.139 Judge Wachtler recognized that judi-
cial consideration of religious doctrine was limited by the first amendment.
Although the court referred to Jones v. Wolf, 40 Serbian Orthodox Diocese
v. Milivojevich, 14 1 and Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 42 it did not
discuss the Supreme Court's analysis of the first amendment issues raised
in these cases.' 43 Instead, the court focused attention on the Supreme
Court's holding in Jones v. Wolf. Judge Wachtler interpreted the Court's
approval of the "neutral principles of law" approach in intrachurch prop-
erty disputes as authority to resolve religious disputes that could be de-
cided solely on secular terms.'"
Applying the "neutral principles" doctrine, the court concluded that al-
though the Ketubah was entered into as part of a religious ceremony, the
case could be decided without interpretation of ecclesiastical law. ' 45 Judge
Wachtler likened the provision calling for a couple's appearance before the
tribunal to a valid arbitration clause in an antenuptial agreement whereby
the parties choose the forum in which to resolve their disputes. 46 Refer-
136. Avitzur, 86 A.D.2d at 136, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
137. Id. at 137, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
138. Avitzzur, 58 N.Y.2d at 11I, 446 N.E.2d at 136-37, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 572-73. The court
of appeals did not discuss the cases distinguished by the lower court regarding promises
contained in civil agreements to obtain a religious divorce. See supra note 25 and accompa-
nying text.
139. Id at 114, 446 N.E.2d at 138, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
140. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
141. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
142. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
143. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d at 114, 446 N.E.2d at 138, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
144. Id. at 114-15, 446 N.E.2d at 138, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
145. Id at 115, 446 N.E.2d at 138-39, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75.
146. Id at 113-14, 446 N.E.2d at 138, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 574; see supra note 30 and accom-
panying text.
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ring to principles of contract law, the court stated that those provisions of
the Ketubah that were not contrary to the laws or public policy of the state
should be enforced. 147
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Jones contended that the majority's deci-
sion violated the first amendment's protection against excessive entangle-
ment by the courts in religious matters. 14' A major portion of the dissent
was spent reviewing the pleadings of the parties. Judge Jones concluded
that the Ketubah could not be enforced without judicial inquiry into Jew-
ish law and tradition. He vehemently disagreed with the majority that the
"neutral principles" approach could be applied, reasoning that secular ob-
ligations cannot be effectively extracted from the religious document. 149
He noted that the wife had originally requested a declaration of all the
rights contained in the Ketubah. 50 According to the dissent, the majority
had conceded that this request was beyond the scope of the courts when it
limited enforcement to the document's secular obligations.'51 He asserted
that in order to determine which provisions were "secular," an examina-
tion of the laws and traditions of the Jewish faith would necessarily be
required. In support of this assertion Judge Jones emphasized that the
husband and wife had each provided a different construction of the
Ketubah, and that the wife had specifically relied on expert testimony re-
garding Jewish law and custom in her affidavit.
152
Judge Jones also noted that there was no evidence that the parties to the
agreement had intended civil enforcement of its provisions. 153 He referred
to the language of the Ketubah that authorized the Bet Din to impose its
own terms of compensation if the parties failed to respond to a request to
appear before the tribunal or failed to adhere to the tribunal's decision.' 5 4
The dissent reasoned that the parties intended this provision as the exclu-
147. Id at 115, 446 N.E.2d at 139, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 575. The court reasoned that selected
provisions of the Ketubah could be enforced without judicial recognition of the entire docu-
ment. Id (citing Ferro v. Bologna, 31 N.Y.2d 30, 286 N.E.2d 244, 334 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1972)).
The Ferro court had stated that although some provisions of a separation agreement were
invalid, the entire contract was not rendered void. 31 N.Y.2d at 36, 286 N.E.2d at 246, 334
N.Y.S.2d at 859.
148. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d at 116, 446 N.E.2d at 139, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (Jones, J., dissent-
ing). Although the dissent raised many pertinent questions regarding the enforcement of the
Ketubah, it failed to cite case authority in its conclusion that enforcement violated the first
amendment.




153. Id at 121, 446 N.E.2d at 140-41, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
154. Id. at 120-21, 446 N.E.2d at 142, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
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sive remedy for a breach of their obligations under the Ketubah and did
not contemplate judicial enforcement of the document.' 55
B. Misapplication of Supreme Court Direction
The practical common sense appeal of the A vitzur court's holding clouds
its constitutional implications. Although compelling the husband to do
only what he had agreed to do, the court disregarded the prohibitions of
the first amendment. While the court of appeals admitted that the amend-
ment prohibited consideration of religious doctrine, it failed to review the
scope of the amendment's limitations. Since Watson v. Jones, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized that the judiciary cannot interpret
church doctrine.' 56 Although the Court has offered different approaches
for resolving first amendment cases, 157 it has never suggested that an in-
quiry that effectively requires an interpretation of ecclesiastical laws and
practice would be permissible.
The Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf approved the use of property and
trust laws to resolve a dispute between factions of a church but did not
indicate whether the approach was applicable to other religious dis-
putes.1 58 A vitzur reflects the difficulties of extending the "neutral princi-
ples" approach beyond intrachurch property disputes' 59 without further
direction by the Supreme Court.
Instead of approaching "neutral principles" as a means to resolve a dis-
pute when controversy does not center around religious doctrine, A vitzur
appears to interpret it as an approach that avoids doctrinal issues within
the controversy. This interpretation fails to recognize the distinction made
by the Supreme Court, in both Hull Church and Jones, between the resolu-
155. Id..
156. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); see supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (three prong test to evaluate the constitutionality of government regulations); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (balancing compelling state interests and first amend-
ment claims); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (distinguishing between conduct
and belief); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929) (fraud
may permit court intervention in religious disputes).
158. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); see also supra note 91 and accompanying
text. The Supreme Court in United Methodist, decided before Jones but after the introduc-
tion of the "neutral principles of law" approach in Hull, appears to have adopted a similar
approach in its decision involving a breach of contract by a religious organization. The
Court, however, indicated that intrachurch dispute cases should be limited to their own
facts. This raises the question whether the Court did in fact apply "neutral principles" in
United Methodist. See generally United Methodist, 439 U.S. at 1372-73.
159. See Reardon v. Lemoyne, 122 N.H. 1042, 454 A.2d 428 (1982).
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tion of a controversy over religious doctrine and the use of principles of
civil law to resolve a property dispute. 6 ' The usefulness of the "neutral
principles" approach, allowing the courts to effectuate the intention of par-
ties to an agreement by recognizing their contractual rights and obliga-
tions, 16 was discussed by the Supreme Court in Jones. By failing to
question whether the parties intended civil enforcement of the Ketubah, 1
62
the majority in Avitzur violated the Supreme Court caveat that cases that
cannot be decided solely on secular terms are not proper for civil court
adjudication. 163 A determination that certain provisions are "secular" and
therefore enforceable is not permissible if it rests upon judicial evaluation
of unresolved doctrinal issues. The majority failed to consider whether the
document was a civil contract before applying contract principles to the
provisions of the document. The different opinions expressed in Minkin,
White, and Hurwitz regarding the validity of the Ketubah suggest that
construction of the document is a matter of religious custom and interpre-
tation of Jewish law.' 64
The dissent, however, specifically addressed this issue of the parties' in-
tention in its reference to the terms of compensation contained in the
Ketubah for breach of the agreement. 65 As the dissent also noted, the
majority conceded that some of the provisions of the Ketubah were unen-
forceable. The logical inference made by Judge Jones was that the court's
extraction of "secular" provisions from the document could only be made
by impermissible inquiry into Jewish laws and customs.
166
The majority and dissent in the appellate division questioned the possi-
ble precedential effect of either enforcing a religious document or denying
the courts jurisdiction over any agreement entered into during religious
ceremonies. 67 It failed, however, to address this issue and confined its
160. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-03; Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 445-47.
161. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603.
162. Id. at 602.
163. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. The court did not specifically inquire
into the legality of compelling an individual to obtain a Get. The husband never alleged his
right to religious belief was being violated but had instead based his claim on the establish-
ment clause. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d at 114, 446 N.E.2d at 138, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 574. Although
the court did not review Minkin or Rubin, these decisions indicate that the acquisition of a
Get does not require participation in religious practice. See supra note 100 and accompany-
ing text.
164. Experts in White and Minkin provided conflicting interpretations of the legal signifi-
cance of the Ketubah. Compare supra notes 111 and 120 and their accompanying texts.
165. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d at 121, 446 N.E.2d at 142, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
166. Avitzur, Id. at 118-19, 446 N.E.2d at 141, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
167. Avilzur 86 A.D.2d at 133, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
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discussion to principles of contract law. Recognition of the first amend-
ment's protection against excessive entanglement by the court in A vitzur
does not necessarily preclude judicial recognition of every agreement
made with a religious organization or as part of a religious ceremony.
1 61
The religion clause requires, however, that judicial recognition must be
denied if the intention of the parties or constructon of the agreement can-
not be determined without inquiry into religious practice or law.
III. CONCLUSION
In A vitzur v. Avitzur, the New York Court of Appeals compelled specific
performance of a provision in a Jewish marriage document. Applying the
"neutral principles of law" approach, the court reasoned that parties to a
valid agreement should be held to their promises. The court restricted its
decision to principles of contract law. Therefore, it failed to recognize that
determinations regarding the legal significance of a religious document's
provisions violate constitutional principles protecting against excessive en-
tanglement by the government in religious doctrine. This judicial recogni-
tion, or nonrecognition of select provisions of the Ketubah, encourages
courts to interpret the significance of ceremonial documents and doctrine.
In its grant of specific performance, Avitzur also failed to address the
problems presented by enforcement of this decree. The imposition of fines
and incarceration to enforce the court's decision raises free exercise clause
issues. A logical extension of Avitzur is the judicial enforcement of the
findings by the religious tribunal, prohibited by the first amendment.
Without such enforcement, however, adjudication of the case is meaning-
less. The serious constitutional problems posed by Avitzur could easily be
avoided by placing promises that the parties intend to be legally enforcea-
ble in antenuptial agreements that have historically been recognized by the
courts.
During the last century, the Supreme Court has attempted to define the
scope of the first amendment's prohibitions. Workable solutions have
been found to resolve intrachurch property disputes and to evaluate the
legality of statutes affecting religious organizations or beliefs. The Court,
however, has not specifically provided direction to the federal and state
courts addressing the religion clause issues raised by individuals attempt-
ing to enforce a practice or agreement of religious consequence. Although
the "neutral principles" approach recognizes legitimate governmental and
168. Property and contract agreements in Jones, Vance, and Reardon were adjudicated
by the courts. The breach of wedding vows, often exchanged in a religious ceremony, are
litigated daily in the divorce courts.
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societal interests in certain contexts, Supreme Court guidance is needed in
order to apply this approach outside the framework of intrachurch prop-
erty disputes, and to assure government neutrality in religious matters.
Elizabeth A. Lieberman

